thanks debanked for the nice idea. im leaning towards:
upgrade/educate the chirons for doing some of the easier tasks mentioned. for example creating subdaos like play2earn and learn2earn together. even upgrade them to official community council
hire more well paid professionals like pepito or chop for the more professional tasks like opportunities and growth and content.
the idea of 3 councils (price, pythian, community) which are doing all the votes for stakers and holders seems cool.
In an ideal world, I agree but by the nature of a council that gets elected. But itās not feasible in my opinion which goes also into this:
It will be up to the Pythians to vote for the members they want to see on the council. Anyone can nominate himself (albeit the staking requirement) and it will be up to the community to decide.
I have the belief that the community will elect the right/best members and if they happen to be highly skilled in these fields, itās great and most likely the reason why the community chooses them.
Yes, that is exactly my point. I donāt think it is realistic to set up the standards this high for the community members.
I had more time available tonight so I figured I could āattackā the Questions or Uncertainties up front 
I believe that the Responsibilities of the Council as listed in the initial proposal encompass a very broad scope of expectations for its members. I would categorize them into three components: 1) Community Coordination and collaboration with the Pyth Data Association, 2) Brand Awareness, Partnerships, and Collaborations, and 3) Governance Participation and Education.
Considering that most of the āpowersā related to the above are currently controlled by Contributors/PYTH Team members, I think that externalizing some decision-making and management regarding the community is an organic way to ārepresent the diverse interestsā of the community. Additionally, expanding the community task force should increase opportunities for community voices to be heard and considered, while easing the handling of the ongoing daily demands.
To me, the initial suggestions are sufficient and coherent with the mandate. I believe that minimal previous involvement in any sphere of the Pyth Community should be required. Such involvement should be verifiable through X or Discord engagement. If not, a Candidate should be co-opted by a recognized member of the Pyth Community. A minimum stake of 1K $PYTH might be slightly low given the current price, but we also aim for the Council structure to stand the test of time and stay reasonable for any competent community member to be eligible for election.
I think that stability is crucial to the success of any project, so a term length of 6 months seems appropriate. The election process for a DAO can be extensive and create a governance āvoidā during its duration, making overly frequent elections counterproductive. Therefore, I suggest no more than 3 elections per year to ensure minimal stability.
I agree with the current proposal of āNo limit on consecutive terms,ā considering the Councilās pivotal role in day-to-day community operations.
I believe that a mechanism akin to a āvote of no confidenceā could be included in the Councilās constitution. Should a significant majority (minimum 66%) of Council members believe that a councilor is underperforming and that a replacement is necessary, or in the event that a councilor requests to be discharged from their responsibilities, a formal vote should be initiated. In a 6-member Council, 4 out of 5 votes would be required to remove an elected member.
This vote would lead to the official removal of the member on the 1st day of the following month, allowing for a partial election to replace the removed councilor during the remainder of that month.
If the period between the 1st day of the following month and the formal removal of the councilor is less than 7 calendar days, or if the next scheduled election is within 1 month, the seat of the removed councilor would remain vacant until the election of a replacement, which implies a minimum 7-day election process.
In my opinion, we need more metrics on the current Community Budget to determine what would be reasonable. Current Community initiatives already have their own allocated budgets, so discussions are needed regarding which responsibilities will be taken over by the Council versus the Contributors
In my rough estimation, we should consider an hourly rate of between $40 and $50 USD expected from each councilor. A portion of the stipend should be paid in liquid $PYTH, with another portion vesting. Itās important to ensure that our vision of what we expect from the Council aligns with the compensation we offer. In my opinion, $500 USD in PYTH per month might be on the lower end. Additionally, we should consider whether councilors would be eligible for other forms of rewards. For instance, if we expect councilors not to participate in rewarding community initiatives like the Impact Awards, this should be factored into their stipend.
I am also curious
Why is the idea of having 6 Council members not realistic? Why canāt it be carried out?
How many Council members is the ideal number then? And why?
Agreed on the idea of keeping council members count to an odd number for tie-breakers.
Re: having council members specialize in certain areas, I think this boils down to how they present themselves when campaigning. It would be hard to enforce this otherwise.
The vouching system is highly interesting too, but I also think it boils down to public relations between the candidate and their campaigning to the public, otherwise the Discord might get gamedā¦
I think what Pepito meant is that a perfect 2/2/2 council may actually happen as a result of not-centralized election.
Not saying that 6 members is not right or that in the best scenario 2/2/2 would happen.
@Pepito Feel free to confirm or not
Thatās right @Planck ! I do not have a strong opinion on the number (be it 5-6-7). But this range feels like it is the right one to keep it pretty focused and also add some fire power for the community to grow.
What a thorough āattackā on the uncertainties 
Thanks for this Frozen
here are some thoughts from me:
This looks like the best way to deal with this and also quite efficient.
However, another election would be time-consuming and waste precious time. I would be in favor of giving the power to the council to āpickā the new one after a ānominationā period (7 days) to go quickly. Could even be from the current group of Chirons.
As shared in @Debanked initial proposal, the Council would be in charge of running the Impact Awards program, Chirons, and other activities.
For some context, the Pyth contributors have allocated 30K $PYTH per cycle. These tokens are not required to be used but the goal is to do so.
A 6-month term would mean running 4 cycles (40 days) and giving a dead period of about 5 days between them, amounting to 120K $PYTH (as things stand now).
I think 150K-180K $PYTH would be a good starting point for this first iteration. We are still early, finishing the 1st official Impact Award Cycle.
Indeed, some precisions to add to this section. I agree that 500 $PYTH is on the lower end of the spectrum to me unless IAs are still distributed like they are today.
I lean towards IAs still being given to council members as they would be a good representation of the work they do daily. If one is crushing it, heāll get xxx IAs as a reward for his work vs. one who contributes less will not.
I agree that considering that if the Council is granted with a power of removal with a significant majority that a selection from a pool of candidates after a ānominationā period would be a much more efficient and agile.
I think that a dedicated budget for Chiron Program should also be included in the Council initial iteration. I would assume between 80K -100K $PYTH could cover the potential need of this ālegā for a 6-month mandate.
That could bring the total to 250K-280K $PYTH for the six first month mandate considering that the DAO would be open to additional funding if needed and justified after discussion between the Council and the DAO.
My understanding of @Debanked is that it was $500 USD/month paid in $PYTH not 500 $PYTH but I think that what you mean as well. Again, this should be aligned with how much time/hours we are looking the Council to invest per month and how we value this time.
What do you envision for this budget? How would it be used?
Yes, so my understanding and initial thinking is that denominating in dollars to be calculated in $PYTH is the best but also not easy. When do we say ā$PYTH = x$ thus its a certain $PYTH amountā?
As for the ātime investedā itās impossible to really determine IMO. The hope is that members invest the time that is worth their while during these 6 months with the stipend. This would be the base layer and if we decide to also keep the IAs available, the āextraā work would be valued with that.
The idea is that if the Chiron Program is to be delegated to the Council it would make sense that the Chiron Allocation be also managed by the Council. With this budget the recruitment of new Chiron(s) and or adjustment to the Chiron Allocation would tied to the Council as well. Not an issue IMO if this budget is kept under the Team responsibility but it does create a gap in terms of managing/administering without actually being in control of the budget.
I think we could decide of a specific moment in terms of point where the āexchange rateā is to be decided. For sake of simplicity I would propose using the $PYTH Price Feed as at 00:00 UTC on the last Friday of each month.
Using this exchange rate, which would be variable each month, the amount of $PYTH payable for the previous month would be easy to determine and transparent.
Understood. I still think that the stipend could be increased a little more considering the IA distribution can be subjective and quite difficult especially for people mostly involved outside of the Discord (X, Telegram, Pyth Forum, etc.). Just my 2 cents
I propose that the token be split 1:10,000
For example, anyone staking or holding 1 pyth v1 token would receive 10,000 pyth v2 tokens.
This would allow the token to attract āmemeā traders, which adds additional utility to the token. It also helps to essentially void outstanding uninvolved tokens that are dormant. The unit bias economic phenomenon should be leveraged on behalf of the protocol.
Hey mate,
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