I think to vote is fine, it is once every few weeks and there is enough time to vote. When I said I dont have time is to participate activately in all the discord activities or Social Media.
Regarding capacity to delegate, it seems interesting but it seems complex for the reward system. If you have a reward system for voting you can do a linear airdrop for each wallet based on the voting power, having a delegate option might add complexity to share the rewards on the different wallets, more if rewards are shared based on voting power because those delegating wallets will be cap.
I definetly agree that delegated voting might create a little too complex system for many people. However, there are still many people who dont want to deep dive into topics and delegating their votes to someone who might serve their interests will be a solution for them to not just randomally vote for the sake of getting rewarded but also letting someome who they essentially trust to vote for them.
I’m personally always in favor of doing your own research but others might find it uncomfortable to some degree and would rather put their votes in the hands of someone else. I dont say I like that but I believe we have to adress that issue for the better of the borad PYTH ecosystem so that the staking/voting rewards will serve these people too
i think the issue with staking rewards it that it adds sell pressure on PYTH which is very much true. But airdrops from third-party Dapps as rewards has no such effect. Plus locked staking rewards that can be pledged to third-party Dapps for additional airdrops would rewards stakers for commitment again without diluting the value of PYTH.
What happened with $IO was completely bizarre. Rewarding social interactions over investors to the point where investors got nothing is akin to jumping into the ocean with a anchor tied to your feet.
Adding such small percentages to the supply on a weekly basis does absoulutely nothing to the price even if 100% of the stskers were to sell their rewards immeditelly which wouldnt happen obviously because there are more than enough people who would rather compound rewards and keep staking.
Inconsistent rewards where we cant pre-determine how much is distributed to people until it actually happens is in my opinion not sustainable and thats why we need to know how much is distributed at any gives time
Voting is the opposite of pointless as it lets people express their opinions to some degree and actually make an impact on the network. I also want to make that a possibility that people would be able to delegate their voting power to someone who they trust to vote for them
There is no real selling pressure sir as the percentages at which the rewards are distributed are very small if you look at it on a weekly basis so even if ALL STAKERS were to sell their rewards at once the price would barely even move.
3rd party airdrops are sound cool but they mean depending on the criteria a 3rd party puts for eligibility and usually not all stakers get rewarded with these airdrops if at all plus pyth got nothing to do with it because its all in the hands of the 3rd party. You cant in my opinion depend on the hope someone creates a new project and also rewards every pyth staker for that because its not a very likely scenario.
I definetly that what $IO did was in my opinion super wierd and unfair towards pretty much everyone ans this just represents another reasom to why we cant trust a 3rd party to give stakers their deserved rewards
In the long term, allowing all users to contribute and benefit from governance is crucial, and removing barriers to entry is key to ensuring we have an active voting network. It also goes without saying that someone’s voting power should be proportionate to their stake.
Where we differ is in our path to achieve this. We think its worth to spend extra time to ideate and implement an innovative staking incentive program rather than following the basic model which most tokens use. There are lots of interesting possibilites to explore (Lock-up period proportionate to stake rewards, Revenue distribution, Tier based system, etc), and settling on what has been done before limits our potential.
In the meantime, the delegate program would be open to anyone who wants to earn incentives and help work on discussions like this. The delegate program is not meant to be super time-consuming, and writing a rationale would only take a few extra minutes assuming the delegate has read the proposal and made an informed vote. The purpose of a delegate rational is simply to ensure people are not randomly voting.
I am enjoying the discussion with @0xkeyrock.sol and @TheDetective however I think Pyth should always think about long term sustainable objectives. Moving to a proof of stake model, similar to major networks, is much more preferable and highly desirable.
Ecosystems like Ethereum and Solana are mega projects and both rely on PoS systems to secure the network and incentivise participation. Pyth should aspire to have similar approach - PoS to allow anyone to stake tokens and contribute to security and participate in network economics.
This will increase the set of possible participants by many multiples and would be a long term strategic solution.
I definetly agree that everyone should be able to vote and I said it myself but functioning as a delegate and take part in onchain votings still consumes a certain amount of time and certain technicality and knowledge to some degree which some people simply dont have the time to or struggling to acquire. As I said earlier on, some people might truly want to help the network growth but simply dont have the time or understanding to do that so implementing a model where they can delegate their votes to someone who they trust will be able to adress this issue. I personally know I can, at least for now, dedicate the time and effort to participate but others might not be able to and delegating to someone like me for the sake of this example will be a solution for them.
I believe that maybe we can make a maximum cap for the amount of votes that a delegate can have so that people with lets say over 100k pyth staked will function as 100k votes for example while people with less tokens will be able to recieve the voting power of others pushing their voting power up (let me know whats your opinion about such a model)
Lastly, I dont believe locking periods is a good idea at all since there can always come some urgent events in peoples lives which come by surpruse where they might have to pull out money regardless of the stage the markets/prices are at
The end result isnt much different as long as the pyth tokenomics stays like it currently is. Once the supply cap is reached there will not be, at least in the current terms, any rewards to give the participants because there is no more supply left to distribute.
Pyth is already proof of stake to some degree (except the staking rewards which is exactly whats trying to be solved here) and unless you want to remove the supply cap and make pyth inflationary you cant really follow solana or ethereum models.
Plus in SOL you have to delegate your tokens unlesa you know how to run a node (which most people definetly dont know) and in ETH you must have a fairly large amount of money to be able to vote and validate the network and vote on stuff (which again most people dont have).
This proposal is meant to solve these exact problems
Maybe we can think of a future proposals of how will the stakers be rewarded once the supply cap is reached but right now the discussion is about the next 4 years which is a fairly long time to come out with a solution to rewarding participants after the supply is at the max level.
Yes I get your point, but I think if we can solve for the issues you raised that would make it an even more bullet proof proposal.
Introduce delegation so that nobody needs to run a node.
Allow small holders to participate at par with large holders.
Do not make Pyth inflationary.
All of these can be solved, along with getting publishers to stake tokens to make Pyth a proof of stake.
What I’m offering is delegation to people who you trust to make the right decision for you in governance proposals and as for the small holders participation its exactly what the proposal here is already talking about.
Plus it doesnt make pyth inflationary or changing anything about its token unlocking schedule.
Publishers have their own rewards and part in the ecosystem and while they publish data, the dapps use this data and we, the stakers, are responsible for governance and the DAO.
I definetly agree that a model where publishers stake tokens and get rewarded/slashed in proportion to the quality and accuracy of their data should be implemented but these publishers got nothing to do with this proposal which focuses on stakers and voters. I also do believe that publishers with better quality data should be given larger rewards but it got nothing to do with delegating them tokens as people would just delegate to their favorite platform (for example binanace, coinbase or just any big name that theres out there) and not necessarily to the best ones with the best data. Rewarding data publishers should be entirely based on statistics and numbers that measure data quality and accuracy and definetly NOT on community member cant really know or differentiate what data is better which is a question with one answer as its based entirely on facts and not opinions
I don’t see any real sell pressure that might come from that. But even if there is, it won’t be any bigger than sell pressure coming from grants and stuff. If I get 10 $Pyth weekly from staking rewards, why would I keep dumping it off the same week? What benefit does that bring to me? I do think that incentivised staking will only bring more buy pressure than sell pressure because more people will be interested in buying and staking $Pyth in order to participate in governance and also earn some rewards.
But wouldnt it be cool if the stakers had the option, to opt in and delegate their tokens to the publisher of their choice. People can make their own choices.
If you think everyone would delegate to the same publisher, we can implement stake caps per publisher, or have a mechanism where the reward% start to decrease as a disincentive. This would make delegators look for other publishers.
If the people choose how much weight of the total rewards a publisher gets they will more than likely choose the “bigger name” publishers by instinct and if they just choose a publisher they like it wont necessarily be the more accurate one.
Moreover, if we put a stake cap on publishers we could never tell who is the more reliable one because there might be a great publisher that reached the max cap for example that will have the same staked weight as a less reliable publisher because thw first one, to whom people wanted to delegate, was already at full capacity so they had to go for the 2nd best.
And again, in order to make the prices as accurate as possible we need to give the higher stakes to the publisher who put out the highest quality of data which will be measured by statistics, numbers and facts and NOT to the “community’s favorite” as in the model you seem to describe
This is not a bad thing, decentralisation is important. A great publisher can become second best and the second best can improve to be the number one.
This is similar to how people stake to different pools, less stake means more rewards and higher stake means lesser rewards. A bit interesting for game theory to play out, and people can even spread out their stake to multiple publishers.
Indeed, maybe a higher stake but need not and should not be the total stake. With the right cap and/or a decreasing return profile, you can incentivise people to stake to different providers.
The issue here is that if there’s already a dashboard showcasing who has been the best data provider for the past week/month in terms of quality, accuracy and integrity there’s simply no need for stakers to determine which publisher gets more weight since its already shown in the statistics. Although it sounds cool as an idea, in this ecosystem, people delegating tokens to data publishers and and putting their tokens at risk of slashing has no benefits for the stakers at all and the publishers rewards and proportionate impact on the data would function just as fine, and actually even better, without stakers who essentially got nothing to do directly with data publishing.
Publishers should simply be proporrionally rewarded based the quality and accuracy of their data to create a sustainable and reliable model where the best possible data is being published in the end of the process. Its as simple as that and anything further might flood back the inaccuracy problem that is exactly what the publisher rewards model tries to solve
I agree voting is a good thing, but in my experience voting in governance proposals is pointless because the holder distributions generally means a few holders can influence or even decide the vote.
If a thousand people vote, and one voter holds 51% of the supply, then it doesn’t matter what the others want to do, because they can never compete.
That’s all I meant by the concept voting is pointless.